

**Treasury Management Strategy Statement  
Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement  
& Annual Investment Strategy 2018/19**



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## **1.0 Introduction**

### **1.1 Background**

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

*"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."*

Full details of the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities can be seen in Schedule 1.

### **1.2 Reporting Requirements**

The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals. These reports are required to be adequately scrutinised by committee before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Scrutiny (Audit and Value for Money Council Services) Committee.

**Prudential and Treasury Indicators and Treasury Strategy** (This report) - The first, and most important report covers:

- the capital plans (including prudential indicators);
- a Minimum Revenue Provision Policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the Treasury Management Strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

**A Mid Year Treasury Management Report** – This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.

**An Annual Treasury Report** – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

In late December 2017, CIPFA issued revised Prudential and Treasury Management Codes. These codes have been revised alongside a review of the Central Government Guidance on investments largely due to some concerns raised in relation to council borrowing levels to directly purchase investment property on the basis of income generation. Whilst the CIPFA codes have been revised, the outcome of the MHCLG review is outstanding. The revised CIPFA codes require all authorities to prepare a capital strategy from 2019/20 onwards, which is intended to provide:

- a high level overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activities contribute to the provision of services;
- an overview of how the associated risk is management;
- the implications for future sustainability.

The aim of the report is to ensure that elected members on the full Council fully understand the overall strategy, governance procedures and risk appetite entailed by this strategy.

The capital strategy will include capital expenditure, investments and liabilities and treasury management in sufficient detail to allow members to understand how stewardship, value for money, prudence, sustainability and affordability will be secured.

The Council already adopts a capital strategy as part of the approval of our annual Medium Term Financial Strategy. This document will be updated taking into account the new requirements, together with the outcome of the Government consultation for 2019/20.

### **1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2018/19**

The strategy for 2018/19 covers two main areas:

#### **Capital Issues**

- \* the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- \* the Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) policy.

#### **Treasury Management Issues**

- \* the current treasury position;
- \* treasury indicators which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- \* prospects for interest rates;
- \* the borrowing strategy;
- \* policy on borrowing in advance of need;

- \* debt rescheduling;
- \* the investment strategy;
- \* creditworthiness policy; and
- \* policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, the CLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and the CLG Investment Guidance.

## ***2.0 Risk Management***

The Council recognises that any investment has an element of risk and it is therefore imperative that such risks are controlled. Good risk management with regard to treasury management is essential. The authority therefore aims to both minimise where possible the probability of a detrimental event occurring; and at the same time reduce the impact of said event. This section highlights the primary risks where the Council has to make informed judgements as to their potential impact.

### **2.1 Interest Rate Risk**

- 2.1.1 Interest rate risk, in the context of a Treasury Management Strategy, is the risk that fluctuations in the levels of interest rates create an unexpected or unbudgeted burden on the Council's finances, against which the Council has failed to protect itself adequately.
- 2.1.2 Section 4.3 sets out detailed advice from the Council's treasury management advisor (Link) on the predicted level of interest rates and the factors that influence them.
- 2.1.3 Choices need to be made about the institutions with whom the Council invests its cash surpluses. In doing so, the Council's priorities are the security of capital and the liquidity of its investments.
- 2.1.4 An assessment that has to be made is the length of time over which investments are made. Where investments are made for longer than one year, factors that need to be considered include:
- rates in 1+ years time could increase above the rate for the investment;
  - Strategically, in line with areas such as the Capital Programme, the authority has to assess whether it can afford for money to be tied up long term.

### **2.2 Inflation Risk**

- 2.2.1 Inflation risk is the risk that prevailing levels of inflation cause an unexpected or unbudgeted burden on the Council's finances against which sufficient provision has not been made. The effect of this is twofold:
- generally as inflation falls so do interest rates; and

- as inflation rises it can impact upon the council's revenue and capital budgets thus reducing cash balances available to invest.

## **2.3 Market and Credit Risks**

- 2.3.1 Market risk is defined as the risk that, through adverse market fluctuations in the value of the principal sums the Council invests, its stated treasury management policies and objectives are compromised, against which effects it has failed to protect itself adequately.
- 2.3.2 The Council therefore needs to maintain an approved lending (counterparty) list that specifies institutions with which the Council will invest and the maximum maturity period of investments held with these institutions. The Investment Strategy also specifies the limit that can be invested with individual counterparties and counterparty categories (section 4.8).
- 2.3.3 The institutions contained on the list need to meet the credit worthiness policy set out at section 4.8.2, which follows the model provided by our Treasury Advisors (Link Asset Services). By undertaking this approach the risk of failure of a third party to meet its investment obligations and the detrimental effect that would ensue on the Council's capital or revenue resources (known as credit and counterparty risk) will be limited.

## **2.4 Liquidity (Cash flow) Risk**

- 2.4.1 Liquidity risk is defined as the risk that cash will not be available when it is needed and that ineffective management of liquidity creates additional unbudgeted costs.
- 2.4.2 This risk is minimised by spreading the maturities of investments throughout the year, but cash flow can be affected by delays in the capital programme and/or capital receipts not being received as forecast.

The Treasury Management Strategy seeks to take into account these risks when specifying activity for the financial year. However, although the actions contained within the Strategy will limit the risks, some risk will still remain. These will be monitored closely by the finance team.

## **3. The Capital Prudential Indicators 2018/19 – 2020/21**

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans are reflected in prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

- 3.1 Capital Expenditure.** This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Estimates have been made in terms of the timing of various expenditure projects.

<b>£'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Actual</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate</b>	<b>2019/20 Estimate</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate</b>
<b>Capital Expenditure</b>	1,999	1,753	6,279*	971	971

*\*includes £3.8m towards debt repayment*

The table below summarises how the above capital expenditure plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources.

<b>Capital Financing £'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Actual</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate</b>	<b>2019/20 Estimate</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate</b>
<b>Financed by:</b>					
Capital receipts	238	248	5,035	100	100
Capital grants	1,671	603	1,244	871	871
Revenue / Reserves	37	902	-	-	-
Borrowing	53	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,999</b>	<b>1,753</b>	<b>6,279</b>	<b>971</b>	<b>971</b>

### **3.2 The Council's Borrowing Need (the Capital Financing Requirement)**

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. The Forecast CFR is set out in the table below.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces indebtedness in line with each assets life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used for.

The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g., finance leases) brought onto the balance sheet. Whilst this increases the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. As at 31<sup>st</sup> March 17, the Council currently has £1.9m of such schemes within the CFR.

<b>£'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Actual</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate</b>	<b>2019/20 Estimate</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate</b>
<b>Capital Financing Requirement</b>	18,595	17,257	12,303	11,566	13,502

There is a forecast reduction in the capital financing requirement in 2017/18 and 2018/19. This follows proposals within the existing and proposed Medium Term Financial Strategy to utilise windfall resources and capital receipts to support the reduction in the underlying debt requirement and generate ongoing savings to the revenue budget. The MTFS 2018/19 proposes to set aside £3.8m of receipts for this purpose.

### 3.3 MRP Policy Statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

CLG Regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 or which in the future will be Supported Capital Expenditure, the MRP policy will be:

- **Existing practice** - MRP will follow the existing practice outlined in former CLG regulations (option 1); These options provide for an approximate 4% reduction in the borrowing need (CFR) each year.

From 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be:

- **Asset Life Method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the proposed regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (option 3);

This option provides for a reduction in the borrowing need over approximately the asset's life.

Repayments included in finance leases are applied as MRP.

### 3.4 Affordability Prudential Indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

**3.5 Actual and estimates of the ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream.** This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

%	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Ratio	12.97%	13.56%	11.59%	10.16%	9.14%

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in the medium term financial strategy. The table above indicates the percentage ratios are reducing from the 2017/18 position, which reflects increasing investment returns and a reduction in the underlying debt costs, as highlighted above.



## 4. Treasury Management Strategy

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 3 provide details of the capital activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this capital activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

### 4.1 Current Portfolio Position

The Council's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2017, with forward projections are summarised below. The tables below show the actual external borrowing (the treasury management operations), against the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing. The forecast Capital financing requirement is planned to reduce as a result of statutory and voluntary repayments, consistent with the MTFS. As a direct result of this, our under borrowed position or temporary internal borrowing will also reduce.

<b>£'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Actual</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate</b>	<b>2019/20 Estimate</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate</b>
Total expected borrowing at 31 March (Gross Debt)	13,349	13,090	12,125	11,576	13,652*
<b>£'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Actual</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate</b>	<b>2019/20 Estimate</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate</b>
<b>CFR – the borrowing need</b>	18,595	17,257	12,303	11,566	13,502*
<b>(Under) / over borrowing</b>	<b>(5,246)</b>	<b>(4,167)</b>	<b>(178)</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>150</b>

*\*assumes that the waste vehicles will be replaced as part of the replacement cycle*

Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its total or gross borrowing, does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2017/18 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.

As shown in the table above, gross debt is anticipated to be lower than the Capital Financing Requirement from 2019/20 onwards. This is because the Council has adopted the strategy of reducing the underlying need to borrow in order to generate ongoing savings to the revenue budget and protect services. This has been necessary due to the unprecedented funding reductions imposed by Central Government and could not have possibly been anticipated when the current portfolio of debt was undertaken. The next large tranche of debt is due to mature in

2025/26, however should there be a suitable business case to repay early this will be considered.

Taking into account the above, the Chief Finance Officer reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator and that the Council has not borrowed for revenue purposes.

#### 4.2. Treasury Indicators: Limits to Borrowing Activity

**The Operational Boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external borrowing is not normally expected to exceed. These limits have been reduced to reflect current plans and the recent approvals to make voluntary debt repayments.

<b>Operational boundary £m</b>	<b>2017/18</b>	<b>2018/19</b>	<b>2019/20</b>	<b>2020/21</b>
Borrowing	16.5	15.5	14.5	12.5
Other long term liabilities	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0
Total	18.5	17.5	16.5	15.5


**The authorised limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. Any increase in debt levels above those already approved will be subject to a business case that clearly demonstrates that the proposal is prudent and sustainable in the long term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.

2. The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

<b>Authorised limit £m</b>	<b>2017/18</b>	<b>2018/19</b>	<b>2019/20</b>	<b>2020/21</b>
Borrowing	18.5	16.5	15.5	14.5
Other long term liabilities	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Total	21.5	19.5	18.5	17.5

The graph below compares external borrowing forecasts with both the capital financing requirement and borrowing limits.



### 4.3 Prospects for Interest Rates

The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives our central view.

	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Bank Rate	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%
5yr PWLB Rate	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
10yr PWLB View	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
25yr PWLB View	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%

As expected, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate at its meeting on 2 November. This removed the emergency cut in August 2016 after the EU referendum. The MPC also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank rate only twice more by 0.25% by 2020 to end at 1.00%. The Link Asset Services forecast as above includes increases in Bank Rate of 0.25% in November 2018, November 2019 and August 2020.

### Investment and borrowing rates

- Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2018/19 but to be on a gently rising trend over the next few years.
- Borrowing interest rates increased sharply after the result of the general election in June and then also after the September MPC meeting when financial markets reacted by accelerating their expectations for the timing of Bank Rate increases.

Since then, borrowing rates have eased back again somewhat. Apart from that, there has been little general trend in rates during the current financial year. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in the future when authorities may not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or the refinancing of maturing debt;

- There will remain a cost of carry to any new long-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost – the difference between borrowing costs and investment returns.

Further details in relation to prospects for interest rates are set out in schedule 3.

#### **4.4 Borrowing Strategy**

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue to be considered.

Given that the MTFS adopts the approach of utilising one-off resources to reduce the underlying borrowing requirement and generate savings to the revenue budget, it is unlikely that any new borrowing (with the exception of finance leases) will be undertaken during 2018/19.

#### **Treasury Management Limits on Activity**

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits. The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

<b>£'000</b>	<b>2018/19</b>	<b>2019/20</b>	<b>2020/21</b>
<b>Interest rate Exposures</b>			
	<b>Upper</b>	<b>Upper</b>	<b>Upper</b>
<b>Upper limits on fixed interest rates based on net debt</b>	9,000	9,000	9,000
<b>Upper limits on variable interest rates based on net debt</b>	4,000	4,000	4,000
<b>Maturity Structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2017/18</b>			
	<b>Lower</b>	<b>Upper</b>	
Under 12 months	-	85%	
12 months to 2 years	-	85%	
2 years to 5 years	-	85%	
5 years to 10 years	-	90%	
10 years and above	-	90%	

#### **4.5 Borrowing in Advance of Need**

The Council will not borrow more than, or in advance of its needs, purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism. However it is not anticipated that any such need will arise in 2018/19.

The forward projections show that the capital financing requirement will be higher than external debt in 2019/20. This is due to the Council adopting a strategy to utilise capital receipts and windfall revenue to reduce the underlying debt requirement and release savings to the revenue budget. The next tranche of debt will mature in 2025, at which point this will not need to be replaced and further savings can be realised.

#### **4.6 Debt Rescheduling**

Re-scheduling opportunities are limited due to the extent of premiums payable on existing debt. Nevertheless consideration will be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

Any rescheduling will be reported to at the earliest meeting following its action.

#### **4.7.1 Municipal Bond Agency**

It is possible that the Municipal Bond Agency will be offering loans to local authorities in the future. The agency hopes that the borrowing rates will be lower than those offered by the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB). This Authority will consider making use of this new source of borrowing as and when appropriate.

## 4.8. Annual Investment Strategy

### 4.8.1 Investment Policy

The Council's investment policy has regard to the CLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the CLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimize the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in schedule 4 under the 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments categories.

Investments, whether specified or non-specified, will conform to the following limits that are set out in the Council's Treasury Management Practices Schedules document:

<b>Table 4</b>	Limit
Maximum Amount deposited with an individual counterparty	£3.5m
Maximum Amount deposited with a part nationalised counterparty	£5.0m
Maximum Amount held with each counterparty group	£6.0m
Maximum Amount held with a part nationalised counterparty group	£7.5m
Maximum proportion of portfolio deposited with Building Societies	£3.5m
Maximum Amount deposited using forward dealing	£3.5m
Maximum Amount held in an individual MMF	£4.0m

\*These limits set the maximum amount authorised by the Council, the Chief Finance Officer will use discretion during the year to impose lower limits as a when appropriate.

## 4.8.2 Creditworthiness policy

This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Link Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to determine the suggested duration for investments. The Council will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

- Yellow 5 years \*
- Dark pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.25
- Light pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used

Y	Pi1	Pi2	P	B	O	R	G	N/C
1	1.25	1.5	2	3	4	5	6	7
Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 2yrs	Up to 1yr	Up to 1yr	Up to 6mths	Up to 100days	No Colour

The Link creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and by using a risk weighted scoring system, does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

Typically the minimum credit ratings criteria the Council use will be a Short Term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1 and a Long Term rating of A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.

All credit ratings will be monitored on a regular basis. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link Asset Services' creditworthiness service.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
- in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in credit default swap spreads against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis via its Passport website, provided exclusively to it by Link Asset Services. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on any external support for banks to help support its decision making process.

The Council currently has a contract for its banking arrangements with Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). Following an EU directive, the provision of our banking service was due to be either sold to another provider or floated on the stock exchange under the brand Williams and Glyn, as part of a large scale reduction of RBS branches. This is looking increasingly unlikely, nevertheless should this progress there is a possibility that the new provider will not meet our counterparty criteria. In order to maintain operational management activities, it is proposed that, subject to review by the Chief Finance Officer, in the event that the new provider falls outside the scope of the counterparty list criteria, that the new provider be incorporated on the lending list but with a reduced overnight limit of £0.5m.

#### **4.8.4 Country limits**

Due care will be taken to consider the country exposure of the Council's investments.

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA from Fitch. The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Schedule 5. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy. The exception to this relates to funds held within AAA rates Money Market Funds and also the United Kingdom.

#### **4.8.5 Investment Strategy**

Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

**Investment returns expectations.** Bank Rate is forecast to stay flat at 0.50% until quarter 4 2018 and not to rise above 1.25% by quarter 1 2021.

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently skewed to the upside and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how quickly inflation pressures rise and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

Budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments are as follows:

2018/19	0.50%
2019/20	0.75%
2020/21	0.75%



**Investment treasury indicator and limit** - total principal funds invested for greater than one year. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end and current economic conditions.

<b>Maximum principal sums invested in excess of 1 Year</b>			
<b>£m</b>	<b>2018/19</b>	<b>2019/20</b>	<b>2020/21</b>
Principal sums invested for longer than 1 year	£m 5.0	£m 5.0	£m 5.0

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its business reserve accounts, notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits (overnight to three months) in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

**4.8.6 Icelandic Bank Investments** – As at 31<sup>st</sup> December the Council had £0.290m of the original £5m invested in failed Icelandic banking institutions outstanding. The administration process is still underway and updates will be provided to members as and when they become available.

#### **4.9 Investment Risk Benchmarking**

The Council will use an investment benchmark to assess the investment performance of its investment portfolio of 6 month LIBID.

#### **4.10 End of year investment report**

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

#### **4.11 Policy on the use of external service providers**

The Council uses Link Asset Services, Treasury Solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

## Schedule 1

### Treasury Management Policy Statement

In accordance with the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management, East Staffordshire Borough Council defines the policies and objectives of its treasury management activities as follows:-

1. The Council defines its treasury management activities as: *"The management of the authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks"*.
2. The Council regards the successful identification, monitoring and control of risk to be the prime criteria by which the effectiveness of its treasury management activities will be measured. Accordingly, the analysis and reporting of treasury management activities will focus on their risk implications for the organization, and any financial instruments entered into to manage these risks.
3. The Council acknowledges that effective treasury management will provide support towards the achievement of its business and service objectives. It is therefore committed to the principles of achieving value for money in treasury management, and to employing suitable comprehensive performance measurement techniques, within the context of effective risk management."

## Schedule 2 Economic Background

**GLOBAL OUTLOOK.** World growth looks to be on an encouraging trend of stronger performance, rising earnings and falling levels of unemployment. In October, the IMF upgraded its forecast for world growth from 3.2% to 3.6% for 2017 and 3.7% for 2018.

In addition, **inflation prospects are generally muted** and it is particularly notable that **wage inflation** has been subdued despite unemployment falling to historically very low levels in the UK and US. This has led to many comments by economists that there appears to have been a fundamental shift downwards in the Phillips curve (this plots the correlation between levels of unemployment and inflation e.g. if the former is low the latter tends to be high). In turn, this raises the question of what has caused this? The likely answers probably lay in a combination of a shift towards flexible working, self-employment, falling union membership and a consequent reduction in union power and influence in the economy, and increasing globalisation and specialisation of individual countries, which has meant that labour in one country is in competition with labour in other countries which may be offering lower wage rates, increased productivity or a combination of the two. In addition, technology is probably also exerting downward pressure on wage rates and this is likely to grow with an accelerating movement towards automation, robots and artificial intelligence, leading to many repetitive tasks being taken over by machines or computers. Indeed, this is now being labelled as being the start of the fourth industrial revolution.

### **KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures**

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as Quantitative Easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

The key issue now is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation is coming towards its close and a new period has already started in the US, and more recently in the UK, on reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and (for the US) reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of an on-going reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this then also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. This resulted in bond markets and equity market prices both rising to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This, therefore, makes both asset categories vulnerable to a sharp correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery by taking too rapid and too strong action, or, alternatively, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.

There is also a potential key question over whether economic growth has become too dependent on strong central bank stimulus and whether it will maintain its momentum against a backdrop of rising interest rates and the reversal of QE. In the UK, a key vulnerability is the low level of productivity growth, which may be the main driver for increases in wages; and decreasing consumer disposable income, which is important in the context of consumer expenditure primarily underpinning UK GDP growth.

A further question that has come to the fore is whether an inflation target for central banks of 2%, is now realistic given the shift down in inflation pressures from internally generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation feeding through into the national economy), given the above mentioned shift down in the Phillips curve.

- Some economists favour a shift to a **lower inflation target of 1%** to emphasise the need to keep the lid on inflation. Alternatively, it is possible that a central bank could simply 'look through' tepid wage inflation, (i.e. ignore the overall 2% inflation target), in order to take action in raising rates sooner than might otherwise be expected.
- However, other economists would argue for a **shift UP in the inflation target to 3%** in order to ensure that central banks place the emphasis on maintaining economic growth through adopting a slower pace of withdrawal of stimulus.
- In addition, there is a strong argument that central banks should target financial market stability. As mentioned previously, bond markets and equity markets could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. There has been much commentary, that since 2008, QE has caused massive distortions, imbalances and bubbles in asset prices, both financial and non-financial. Consequently, there are widespread concerns at the potential for such bubbles to be burst by exuberant central bank action. On the other hand, too slow or weak action would allow these imbalances and distortions to continue or to even inflate them further.
- Consumer debt levels are also at historically high levels due to the prolonged period of low cost of borrowing since the financial crash. In turn, this cheap borrowing has meant that other non-financial asset prices, particularly house prices, have been driven up to very high levels, especially compared to income levels. Any sharp downturn in the availability of credit, or increase in the cost of credit, could potentially destabilise the housing market and generate a sharp downturn in house prices. This could then have a destabilising effect on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and GDP growth. However, no central bank would accept that it ought to have responsibility for specifically targeting house prices.

**UK.** After the UK surprised on the upside with strong economic growth in 2016, **growth in 2017 has been disappointingly weak**; quarter 1 came in at only +0.3% (+1.8% y/y), quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.5% y/y) and quarter 3 was +0.4% (+1.5% y/y). The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 80% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure. However, more recently there have been encouraging statistics from the **manufacturing sector** which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year while robust world growth has also been supportive. However, this sector only accounts for around 10% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the overall GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

While the Bank of England is expected to give forward guidance to prepare financial markets for gradual changes in policy, the Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 14 September 2017 managed to shock financial markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise soon. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that it expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years' time. The Bank revised its forecast for the peak to just over 3% at the 14 September meeting. (Inflation actually came in at 3.1% in November so that may prove now to be the peak.) This marginal revision in the Bank's forecast can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment having already fallen to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that the amount of spare capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of automation and globalisation. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a *decrease* in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so this would cause additional inflationary pressure over the next few years.

At Its 2 November meeting, the MPC duly delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate. It also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank Rate only twice more in the next three years to reach 1.0% by 2020. This is, therefore, not quite the 'one and done' scenario but is, nevertheless, a very

relaxed rate of increase prediction in Bank Rate in line with previous statements that Bank Rate would only go up very gradually and to a limited extent.

However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to accelerate significantly towards the end of 2017 and then into 2018. This view is based primarily on the coming fall in inflation, (as the effect of the effective devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum drops out of the CPI statistics), which will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power. In addition, a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario was indeed to materialise, then the MPC would be likely to accelerate its pace of increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards.

It is also worth noting the contradiction within the Bank of England between action in 2016 and in 2017 by two of its committees. After the shock result of the EU referendum, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted in August 2016 for emergency action to cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, restarting £70bn of QE purchases, and also providing UK banks with £100bn of cheap financing. The aim of this was to lower borrowing costs, stimulate demand for borrowing and thereby increase expenditure and demand in the economy. The MPC felt this was necessary in order to ward off their expectation that there would be a sharp slowdown in economic growth. Instead, the economy grew robustly, although the Governor of the Bank of England strongly maintained that this was *because* the MPC took that action. However, other commentators regard this emergency action by the MPC as being proven by events to be a mistake. Then in 2017, we had the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) of the Bank of England taking action in June and September over its concerns that cheap borrowing rates, and easy availability of consumer credit, had resulted in too rapid a rate of growth in consumer borrowing and in the size of total borrowing, especially of unsecured borrowing. It, therefore, took punitive action to clamp down on the ability of the main banks to extend such credit! Indeed, a PWC report in October 2017 warned that credit card, car and personal loans and student debt will hit the equivalent of an average of £12,500 per household by 2020. However, averages belie wide variations in levels of debt with much higher exposure being biased towards younger people, especially the 25 -34 year old band, reflecting their lower levels of real income and asset ownership.

One key area of risk is that consumers may have become used to cheap rates since 2008 for borrowing, especially for mortgages. It is a major concern that some consumers may have over extended their borrowing and have become complacent about interest rates going up after Bank Rate had been unchanged at 0.50% since March 2009 until falling further to 0.25% in August 2016. This is why forward guidance from the Bank of England continues to emphasise slow and gradual increases in Bank Rate in the coming years. However, consumer borrowing is a particularly vulnerable area in terms of the Monetary Policy Committee getting the pace and strength of Bank Rate increases right - without causing a sudden shock to consumer demand, confidence and thereby to the pace of economic growth.

Moreover, while there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two to three years will actually pan out.

**EZ.** Economic growth in the eurozone (EZ), (the UK's biggest trading partner), had been lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of QE. However, growth picked up in 2016 and has now gathered substantial strength and momentum thanks to this stimulus. GDP growth was 0.6% in quarter 1 (2.1% y/y), 0.7% in quarter 2 (2.4% y/y) and +0.6% in quarter 3 (2.6% y/y). However, despite providing massive monetary stimulus, the European Central Bank is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in November inflation was 1.5%. It is therefore unlikely to start on an upswing in rates until possibly 2019. It has, however, announced that it will slow down its monthly QE purchases of debt from €60bn to €30bn from January 2018 and continue to at least September 2018.

**USA.** Growth in the American economy was notably erratic and volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 is following that path again with quarter 1 coming in at only 1.2% but quarter 2 rebounding to 3.1% and quarter 3 coming in at 3.2%. Unemployment in the US has also fallen to the lowest level for many years, reaching 4.1%, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been

building. The Fed has started on a gradual upswing in rates with four increases in all and four increases since December 2016; the latest rise was in December 2017 and lifted the central rate to 1.25 – 1.50%. There could then be another four increases in 2018. At its September meeting, the Fed said it would start in October to gradually unwind its \$4.5 trillion balance sheet holdings of bonds and mortgage backed securities by reducing its reinvestment of maturing holdings.

**CHINA.** Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

**JAPAN.** GDP growth has been gradually improving during 2017 to reach an annual figure of 2.1% in quarter 3. However, it is still struggling to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

## SCHEDULE 3 - Prospects for Interest Rates

The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives our central view.

	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Bank Rate	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%
5yr PWLB Rate	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
10yr PWLB View	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
25yr PWLB View	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%

As expected, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate at its meeting on 2 November. This removed the emergency cut in August 2016 after the EU referendum. The MPC also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank rate only twice more by 0.25% by 2020 to end at 1.00%. The Link Asset Services forecast as above includes increases in Bank Rate of 0.25% in November 2018, November 2019 and August 2020.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. It has long been expected, that at some point, there would be a more protracted move from bonds to equities after a historic long-term trend, over about the last 25 years, of falling bond yields. The action of central banks since the financial crash of 2008, in implementing substantial Quantitative Easing, added further impetus to this downward trend in bond yields and rising bond prices. Quantitative Easing has also directly led to a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and took on riskier assets. The sharp rise in bond yields since the US Presidential election in November 2016 has called into question whether the previous trend may go into reverse, especially now the Fed. has taken the lead in reversing monetary policy by starting, in October 2017, a policy of not fully reinvesting proceeds from bonds that it holds when they mature.

Until 2015, monetary policy was focused on providing stimulus to economic growth but has since started to refocus on countering the threat of rising inflationary pressures as stronger economic growth becomes more firmly established. The Fed. has started raising interest rates and this trend is expected to continue during 2018 and 2019. These increases will make holding US bonds much less attractive and cause their prices to fall, and therefore bond yields to rise. Rising bond yields in the US are likely to exert some upward pressure on bond yields in the UK and other developed economies. However, the degree of that upward pressure is likely to be dampened by how strong or weak the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress towards the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.

From time to time, gilt yields – and therefore PWLB rates - can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis and emerging market developments. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts (and MPC decisions) will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is probably to the downside, particularly with the current level of uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- The Bank of England takes action too quickly over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Geopolitical risks, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, possibly Italy, due to its high level of government debt, low rate of economic growth and vulnerable banking system.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- Germany is still without an effective government after the inconclusive result of the general election in October. In addition, Italy is to hold a general election on 4 March and the anti EU populist Five Star party is currently in the lead in the polls, although it is unlikely to get a working majority on its own. Both situations could pose major challenges to the overall leadership and direction of the EU as a whole and of the individual respective countries. Hungary will hold a general election in April 2018.
- The result of the October 2017 Austrian general election has now resulted in a strongly anti-immigrant coalition government. In addition, the Czech ANO party became the largest party in the October 2017 general election on a platform of being strongly against EU migrant quotas and refugee policies. Both developments could provide major impetus to other, particularly former Communist bloc countries, to coalesce to create a major block to progress on EU integration and centralisation of EU policy. This, in turn, could spill over into impacting the Euro, EU financial policy and financial markets.
- Rising protectionism under President Trump
- A sharp Chinese downturn and its impact on emerging market countries

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- UK inflation returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.
- The Fed causing a sudden shock in financial markets through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed. Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of Quantitative Easing, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.



## SCHEDULE 4 - Specified and Non-Specified Investments and Limits

**SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum 'high' quality criteria where applicable.

**NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** These are any investments which do not meet the Specified Investment criteria. A maximum of £5m will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment

A variety of investment instruments will be used, subject to the credit quality of the institution, and depending on the type of investment made it will fall into one of the above categories.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

### **SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:**

(All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum 'high' rating criteria where applicable)

	* Minimum credit criteria / colour band	Max. maturity period
<b>DMADF – UK Government</b>	N/A	Up to 1 year
UK Government gilts	AAA	Up to 1 year
UK Government Treasury bills	AAA	Up to 1 year
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	Up to 1 year
Money market funds: CNAV, LVNAV & VNAV	AAA	Liquid
Local authorities	N/A	Up to 1 year
Term deposits with banks and building societies	Yellow Purple Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	Up to 5 years Up to 2 years Up to 1 year Up to 1 year Up to 6 Months Up to 3 months Not for use
CDs or corporate bonds with banks and building societies	Yellow Purple Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	Up to 5 years Up to 2 years Up to 1 year Up to 1 year Up to 6 Months Up to 3 months Not for use

**NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** A maximum of £5m will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment.

From 1 April 2004 all Councils were given the freedom to invest for periods greater than 365 days, based on criteria set out in their Annual Investment Strategy. These investments are defined as “Non-Specified Investments” and the Council is required to set out in this Investment Strategy the following:

- (i) The procedures for determining which categories of such investments may be prudently used:

Investments will only be made with Banks or Building Societies in accordance with the credit worthiness methodology outlined at 4.8.2.

- (ii) The categories of investments identified as prudent to be used during the year:

<b>Investment</b>	<b>Why Use it?</b>	<b>Associated Risks</b>
Sterling Term deposits with maturities greater than 365 days.	(i) Certainty over period invested.  (ii) No movement in capital value of deposit despite changes of rate of return in interest rate environment.	(i) Liquid: as a general rule, cannot be traded or repaid prior to maturity. (ii) Return will be lower if interest rates rise after making the investment. (iii) Credit risk: potential for greater deterioration in credit quality over longer period.
Callable deposits with maturities greater than 365 days.	Enhanced income - potentially higher return than using a term deposit with similar maturity.	(i) liquid – only borrower has the right to pay back deposit; the lender does not have a similar call. (ii) Period over which investment will actually be held is not known at the outset. (iii) Interest rate risk: borrower will not pay back deposit early if interest rates rise after deposit is made.
Forward deposits for periods greater than 365 days.	Known rate of return over period the monies are invested - aids forward planning.	(i) Credit risk is over the whole period, not just when monies are actually invested. (ii) Cannot renege on making the investment if credit rating falls or interest rates rise in the interim period.
Property Funds ( <i>note 1 below</i> )	(i) Diversification of investment portfolio;  (ii) Enhanced income	(i) liquidity – property funds are a long term investment due to the entry and exit fees  (ii) exposure of capital to loss in values

*Note 1: The property fund instruments can be deemed capital expenditure, and as such will be an application (spending) of capital resources. This Authority will seek guidance on the status of any fund it may consider using. Appropriate due diligence will also be undertaken before investment of this type is undertaken.*

The maximum maturity of investment will be 5 years for all categories, with the exception of property funds. For forward deposits, this is the negotiated deal period plus period of deposit.

## Schedule 5: Approved Countries for Investments

*This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA or higher and also have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Link Asset Services credit worthiness service.*

### AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

### AA+

- Finland
- Hong Kong
- U.S.A.

### AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- UK

This list was compiled on 15-1-18